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ABSTRACT 
Guiding Principle 28: The Unfulfilled Promise to End Protracted Internal 
Displacement in Azerbaijan 
Kaleigh Rose McLaughlin 
Director: Eric Jepsen, Ph.D. 
In 1998 internal displacement became a major focus of international concern with the 
adoption the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the United Nations. This 
seminal document outlined the rights and protections of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), as well as developing policy solutions for ending displacement. In the two decades 
since the adoption of the Guiding Principles, there has been an explosion of research into 
various case studies. This paper re-examines the case of Azerbaijan within a new 
theoretical framework. This paper uses the work of Walter Kalin, former UN Secretary-
General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (2004-2010), and Phil 
Orchard, an eminent scholar of internal displacement, to argue that contrary to the reports 
of international organizations and other academic scholars, Azerbaijan has failed to make 
any significant progress in resolving its situation of protracted internal displacement, and 
has actively implemented policies which undermine a resolution to internal displacement. 
This paper further offers the case of Georgia as a policy contrast to Azerbaijan. This paper 
further asks the question of how the international community can better advocate for 
durable solutions in recalcitrant and reluctant states.  
KEYWORDS: Azerbaijan, Guiding Principles, Durable Solutions, Internal Displacement 
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Introduction 
In 1998 internal displacement became a major focus of international concern with 
the adoption the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the United Nations. 
This seminal document outlined the rights and protections of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), as well as setting forth policies for resolving and ending displacement. In the two 
decades since the adoption of the Guiding Principles, many situations of internal 
displacement across the globe have become protracted, a situation where resolutions to 
displacement are not forthcoming, nor expected in the foreseeable future. The Global 
Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) recorded “28 million new internal 
displacements associated with conflict and disasters across 148 countries and territories” 
in 20181. In its key conclusion, GRID found that “Cyclical and protracted displacement 
continues to be driven by political instability, chronic poverty and inequality, 
environmental and climate change. Many [internally displaced persons] IDPs are 
returning to insecure areas with few socio-economic opportunities. Instead of creating the 
conditions for lasting solutions, this is recreating conditions of risk and increasing the 
likelihood of crises erupting again in the future”2.     
 As instances of internal displacement continue to increase, there has been an 
explosion of research on internal displacement. The academic scholarship has focused 
variously on case studies, international cooperation, methods of data collection and 
monitoring, and the policy solutions for ending protracted displacement. This paper adds 
 
1 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Global Report on Internal Displacement Summary, (IDMC, 
2019) 2. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
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to the academic scholarship on protracted internal displacement by re-examining the case 
of Azerbaijan within a new theoretical framework. This paper uses the work of Phil 
Orchard and Walter Kälin to argue that not only is Azerbaijan stagnating in implementing 
policy to end internal displacement, but it is actively undermining such policies, 
perpetuating internal displacement indefinitely. This paper begins by outlining some of 
the major historical developments in Azerbaijan which produced the current situation of 
internal displacement. Following the case background, the paper presents the definition 
of the terms: internally displaced person, refugees, and protracted displacement. This 
section also seeks to provide a brief overview of the international laws which form the 
major protection regimes of IDPs and refugees.      
 The paper then moves into presenting the work of Phil Orchard and Walter Kälin. 
Orchard offers three ‘factors of success’ and ‘factors of failure’ which contribute to a 
nation’s successful implementation of the Guiding Principles. The factors of success and 
failure are examined in the context of Azerbaijan to provide an understanding of systemic 
processes which contribute to the failure to end internal displacement in the country. The 
paper will then look at specific policies and policy obstacles as theorized by Walter Kälin 
to create an in-depth assessment of Azerbaijan’s progress toward resolving internal 
displacement.            
 The paper then offers an examination of two major policy trends—policies which 
have the overall effect of undermining resolution, and policies which deliberately prevent 
resolution—emerging in Azerbaijan regarding internal displacement. The paper will then 
present a contrasting case study of internal displacement in the neighboring nation of 
Georgia, to highlight the differences between the two nations’ approach to internal 
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displacement. The paper will conclude with policy recommendations to promote a 
resolution of internal displacement but will also challenge policy advocates and 
international actors to redesign their approach to recalcitrant states.  
Methodology 
 
This paper will present an in-depth case study of Azerbaijan, highlights various 
facets of the nation’s policies as they related to internally displaced persons to argue that 
the nation is deliberately undermining durable solutions. However, presenting this 
argument within the context of a single case study could lead to the conclusions of this 
paper being dismissed as anomalous. In order to avoid such a dismissal this paper will 
provide a brief comparison of IDP policies in Azerbaijan, to the internal displacement 
policies in the nation of Georgia.        
 As a comparative case study, Georgia was selected due to its similarities with 
Azerbaijan. Both nations lie within the Caucasus geographic region, both had similar 
historical trajectories in emerging during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and both face 
‘frozen conflicts’ which contribute to the situation of internal displacement in both 
nations. While both cases have similar qualitative aspect, the approach to internal 
displacement by the two governments has been remarkably differentiated. Using Georgia 
as a comparison case study of internal displacement underscores the fundamental 
argument of this paper: that Azerbaijan is deliberately undermining the prospect of 
durable solutions, and provides scholars further avenues of research in attempting to 
understand why these nations produced two very different approaches to internal 
4 
 
displacement. Understanding the divergence in the approaches of these two nations may 
provide insight into other cases of internal displacement beyond the Caucasus region. 
Case Background 
The Nagorno-Karabakh War fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan between 
1988—19943 produced over half a million internally displaced persons (IDPs)4. As of 
2018 the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan accounted for 6.5% 
of the total population, numbering 644,000 people in total5. The forced migrations and 
displacements began in 1988 when the regional parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan voted in favor of a formal request to Soviet 
authorities which would transfer the region to Armenia6.    
 Within a week of the vote, violence broke out and by September of 1988 large 
scale displacements began. By May 1992 Azerbaijan had lost the Nagorno-Karabakh 
territory7 when the Armenians captured the city of Shusha. “The loss of Shusha was the 
greatest blow to Azerbaijan [as it] removed [the nation’s] last strategic foothold in 
Karabakh…”8. Eventually, “all the Azerbaijanis [were] expelled from Karabakh. For the 
Armenians, it seemed to be the culmination of a triumphant campaign—but in fact, the 
 
3 1994 represents the year in which large scale military operations ceased due to the signing of a cease-fire. 
However, violations of the cease-fire and small-scale confrontations are regularly recorded, most notable in 
April 2016, also called the ‘April War’. 
4 Recognizing that the number of IDPs is highly politicized and contentious this paper estimates that there 
were approximately 530,000 people internally displaced within Azerbaijan between 1988—1994. This 
figure is arrived at from author Thomas de Waal (Black Garden, 2013, p. 327). De Waal provides a total 
number of 750,000 displaced; removing from this number his listed estimates of refugees, I arrived at the 
number of 530,000 internally displaced. 
5 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Azerbaijan”, IDMC, https://www.internal-
displacement.org/countries/azerbaijan 
6 Thomas de Waal, Black Garden, (New York University Press, 2013) 12 & 331. 
7 See Appendix A 
8 Ibid., 193. 
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active phase of the war had only just begun”9.      
 Once Karabakh had been captured the Armenian military forces began to move 
outside of the contested territory and into Azerbaijani territories. The first to fall was 
Lachin; captured within a week of Shusha, Lachin was particularly easy to capture due to 
the fact that Lachin is located on the foothills of the mountains which comprise the 
Nagorno-Karabakh territory10. Kelbejar was the second adjacent province captured by the 
Armenian military in April of 1993. After Kelbejar, Aghdam was captured in July of 
1993. In August of 1993, the Armenians captured the provinces of Fizuli, Jebrail, and 
Kubatly. The final Azerbaijani province captured was that of Zengelan in October of 
1993.            
 With casualties, refugees, and internally displaced persons, and violence 
increasing the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to 
negotiate a cease fire; on May 12, 1994 the cease-fire came into effect, ending large scale 
military operations between the two nations. It is important that a cease-fire does not 
resolve any outstanding political disputes, but simply halts military operations. “With a 
cease-fire in place but no political agreement signed, the dispute now entered a strange 
phase of ‘no war, no peace’. The battles were over, but the fundamental issues of the 
conflict were still unresolved”11. Additionally, the cease-fire essentially fixed the borders 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan to their positions in 1994, which placed Armenia in control of 
both the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, and seven adjacent, uncontested 
Azerbaijani provinces. Displaced and unable to return as a result of the fixed and closed 
 
9 Ibid., 195. 
10 Thomas de Waal, Black Garden, 195. 
11 Ibid., 251. 
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borders, those displaced by the conflict have been living in a state of limbo for twenty-six 
years.             
 The Nagorno-Karabakh War produced three distinct waves displacement. “First, 
in 1988-1989, when the conflict was in its early stages, some 200,000 ethnic Azerbaijani 
refugees arrived from Armenia. When full-scale war erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh in 
1992, some [100,000] fled…The last and largest forced displacement occurred in 1993 
and 1994, when over 500,000 Azeris living in six other districts around Nagorno-
Karabakh were forced to flee in the wake of an Armenian military offensive”12.  
 Given the magnitude of displacement, Azerbaijan establish its State Committee 
for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in 1993, in order to focus 
specifically on issues related to displacement. By 1999 Azerbaijan had established two 
majors law regarding IDP protections: Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On IDP and 
Refugee Status, and the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic On Social Protection of 
Internally Displaced Persons and Persons equated to Them13. The Law on IDP and 
Refugee Status set forth the definition of an IDP, and “regulates the rights and obligations 
of IDPs, including the right to free accommodation, health services, social assistance, 
pensions and primary education”, among other provisions14. The Law on Social 
Protection “grants IDPs the right to free temporary accommodation, assistance in finding 
employment, free health care, social assistance and pensions, free primary and secondary 
University education, free public transport and exemption from the payment of utilities 
 
12 Yulia Gureyeva-Aliyeva et al., Can you be an IDP for Twenty Years: A Comparative Field Study on the 
Protection Needs and Attitudes Towards Displacement and IDPs and Host Communities in Azerbaijan, 
(Brookings Institution-London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, 2011), 5. 
13 State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic Azerbaijan, 
“Regulation”, http://idp.gov.az/en/law/cat/1/parent/15 
14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Azerbaijan: Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of 
Internally Displaced Persons (UNHCR, 2009), 17. 
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and taxes”15.           
 In 2001, “the government began to more actively address the needs of IDPs, 
including through a number of presidential decrees…”16. As of the latest UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons report,  “a total of 95 
orders and decrees were signed by the President, 357 resolutions and decrees were 
approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and 33 laws were adopted by the  National 
Parliament…”17. A 2004 presidential decree inaugurated one of the nation’s most 
extensive social programs, the State Program for the Improvement of Living Standards 
and Generation of Employment for Refugees and IDPs18. In conjunction with the 2004 
State Program for the Improvement of Living Standards, Azerbaijan announced the 
development of a ‘Great Return’ plan with assistance from UNHCR19.  
 A major focus of the presidential decrees has been the closure of temporary IDP 
housing sites, nine camps were closed between 2003 and 2006, the final three camps 
were closed in 200720. The closure in 2007 “completed the relocation of some 100,000 
IDPs living in the most deplorable conditions to specially designated settlements”21. In 
2008, several presidential decrees approved state programs on poverty reduction, 
employment strategies, and socioeconomic development22. This represents a brief case 
 
15 Ibid., 17. 
16 Phil Orchard, Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality (Routledge, 2019), 146. 
17 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 
Chaloka Beyani (United Nations, 2015), 5. 
18 Global Protection Cluster. “Azerbaijan”, http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/2018/07/25/azerbaijan/ 
19 International Crisis Group, Tackling Azerbaijan’s IDP Burden, (International Crisis Group, 2012) 11. 
20 State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic Azerbaijan. “Liquidation 
of Temporary Settlements”, http://idp.gov.az/en/content/8/parent/21 
21 Yulia Gureyeva-Aliyeva et al., Can you be an IDP for Twenty Years: A Comparative Field Study on the 
Protection Needs and Attitudes Towards Displacement and IDPs and Host Communities in Azerbaijan, 
(Brookings Institution-London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, 2011), 6. 
22 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 
Chaloka Beyani, 5. 
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history on the causes of internal displacement in Azerbaijan, and major developments 
regarding IDP protection within the nation.  
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as adopted by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) defines IDPs as “persons or 
groups of persons who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made 
disasters, and who have no crossed and internationally recognized state border”23. While 
the definition of IDPs as set out in the Guiding Principles has operated as the standard for 
international and non-governmental organizations, individual state definitions of IDPs 
vary. Azerbaijan’s State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons defines IDPs as “persons being forced to leave their place of permanent 
residence in territory of the Azerbaijan Republic…as a result of external military 
aggression, capture of certain territories, or presence of such territories under regular 
bombardment”24. As this paper specifically focuses on conflict induced displacement in 
Azerbaijan, IDPs and situations of displacement caused by natural or man-made disasters 
are not included in any further discussion.      
 
23 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (United Nations, 1998) 1. 
24 State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic Azerbaijan. “Privileges.” 
State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic Azerbaijan. 
http://idp.gov.az/en/content/7/parent/21  
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Internally Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Protection Regimes 
While IDPs are populations which remain within their home country during a crisis, 
refugees are populations which cross international borders and pass into foreign nations. 
This difference has significant legal implications, whereas IDPs “have not left their own 
country [sic] they remain under the jurisdiction of their government…the[ir] protection is 
primarily national protection”25. However, as refugees “cannot turn to their own 
government for protection they are in need of protection abroad”26. These differences are 
the foundation for the separate international protection regimes which currently exist. IDPs, 
as previously mentioned, are protected by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
a non-binding or soft law, document. Refugees, however, are protected under the auspices 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations, by which nations are legally 
obligated to comply27. The issue of state sovereignty, which was one of the primary reasons 
IDPs were excluded from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is also the reason that the Guiding 
Principles are non-binding, soft law28. As the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created both 
refugees and IDPs is it necessary to delineate between these two populations. Moreover, 
due to the different international protection regimes it is essential to acknowledge and 
understand the scope and limitations of each.  
 
25  Walter Kälin, “Internal Displacement,” in The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration 
Studies, ed. Elena Fiddan-Qasmiyeh (London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 165.  
26 Ibid., 165. 
27 Azerbaijan signed the 1951 Refugee Convention on February 12, 1993. 
28 Phil Orchard, The Contested Origins of Internal Displacement, (International Journal of Refugee Law, 
2016) 3. 
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Literature Review 
Due to the centrality of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement within 
the literature on protracted displacement, the literature review begins by highlighting the 
basic tenants set forth by the document. In addition to creating the standard definition of 
an internally displaced person, the Guiding Principles identified thirty principles 
regarding the protection of IDPs. These principles focus on a range of issues: protection 
during displacement, protection from displacement, and humanitarian assistance to name 
a few29. In tangent protections, the Guiding Principles also laid out three specific 
solutions to internal displacement, known as the durable solutions. The durable solutions 
consist of repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration30. The Guiding Principles had a 
transformative effect in the way the international community recognizes IDPs as a 
distinct population with specific needs, this is evidenced by “a review of 43 peace 
agreements signed between 1990 and 2008 [which] found that while only ten of the 18 
peace agreements signed before 1998 mentioned internal displacement, all but one of the 
post-1998 agreements have included a reference to IDPs”31 As Francis Deng, the first 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, noted “the 
Guiding Principles…restate existing norm[s] and seek[s] to clarify grey areas and fill in 
the gaps…[they] provide valuable practical guidance to governments, other competent 
authorities, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs in their work with internally 
displaced persons”32.  Understanding the basic content of the Guiding Principles and the 
 
29 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 3, 5, 13. 
30 Ibid, 14. 
31 Elizabeth Ferris, Assessing the Impact of the Principles: an unfinished task, (Forced Migration Review, 
2008), 10. 
32 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1. 
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attendant durable solutions is essential because is the basis on which policy discussions, 
debates, and monitoring are based.       
 One of the major themes of this research regarding internal displacement has been 
the legal transformation and dissemination of the Guiding Principles. In 2006, “the Great 
Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons 
oblige[d] signatory states to adopt and implement the Guiding Principles”33. The 2006, 
Great Lakes Protocol was the first time the Guiding Principles were incorporated into the 
international legal framework in a legally binding manner. In 2009, the African Union 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(the Kampala Convention), further incorporated elements of the Guiding Principles in a 
major international accord34. Furthermore, “at the regional level, the Organization of 
American States and the Council of Europe have recommended the adoption of the 
Guiding Principles to their member states”35. In the case of the Council of Europe, the 
“recommendations do more than just re-state the non-binding Guiding Principles. They 
underline the binding obligations undertaken by the Council of Europe member states 
that go beyond the level of commitments reflected in the Guiding Principles”36.   
 Another focus of internal displacement research has focused on humanitarian 
coordination in addressing the needs of IDPs. “The Principles have played a significant 
role in shaping UNHCR’s operational responses for IDPs…in 2003 [UNHCR] sought to 
improve its response through an inter-agency ‘collaborative approach’, which allocated 
 
33 Brigitta Jaska & Jeremy Smith, Africa: from voluntary principles to binding standards, (Forced 
Migration Review, 2008), 18.  
34 Romola Adeola, The Kampala Convention and the right not to be arbitrarily displaced, (Forced 
Migration Review, 2018), 15.  
35 Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson, Achievements, challenges and recommendations: summary of 
outcomes of the GP10 Conference (Forced Migration Review, 2008), 6.  
36 Corien Jonker, Protecting IDPs in Europe, (Forced Migration Review, 2008) 15. 
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responsibilities informally”37. In 2005, this approach changed to in order to “increase 
predictability, and accountability, particularly in responding to internal displacement. 
Agencies were assigned leadership responsibilities under the ‘cluster approach’. UNHCR 
formally assumed leadership responsibilities for three clusters: protection, camp 
coordination and camp management, and emergency shelter”38.   
 Academic scholarship has also been focused on reassessing the definition of 
internally displaced persons, to increasingly emphasize that internal displacement is 
increasingly occurring as a result of natural disasters, man-made disasters, and 
development. “The current legal and normative framework needs to be re-examined in 
the light of new categories of forced migrants as a result of climate change-related 
disasters or long-term environmental degradation”39. In a special 2018 edition of Forced 
Migration Review, two scholars noted that the definition of an IDP still tends to connotate 
a person fleeing from violence or human rights violations. One article stressed that there 
are “other causes [of internal displacement] such as climate change, natural disasters, and 
development…”40. Another scholar noted that “Work is still needed on those elements of 
the Guiding Principles that have been somewhat neglected. For example, millions of 
people are affected each year by development-related displacement, but their protection 
often falls short of agreed standards”41.        
 Issues of monitoring and data have also been of concern to scholars of internal 
 
37 Khassim Diagne & Hannah Entwisle, UNHCR and the Guiding Principles, (Forced Migration Review, 
2008) 33.  
38 Khassim Diagne & Hannah Entwisle, UNHCR and the Guiding Principles, 15. 
39 Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson, Achievements, challenges and recommendations: summary of 
outcomes of the GP10 Conference, 7. 
40 Nadine Walicki et al, The GP20 Plan of Action: a rallying call to stakeholders, (Forced Migration 
Review, 2018) 6.  
41 Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, Foreword: The 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles—building solidarity, 
forging commitment, (Forced Migration Review, 2018) 4.  
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displacement. “Monitoring internal displacement…[informs] humanitarian actors so that 
they can tailor their efforts, and programmes more efficiently. Lastly, monitoring internal 
displacement [helps] ensure national governments’ accountability by presenting them, 
their population and the international community with the results of their actions—or lack 
thereof”42. In the course of monitoring situations of internal displacement globally it has 
been noted that “with an increasing number of IDPs residing in urban centers, states and 
protection agencies must seek new and appropriate means of providing them with 
adequate protection and assistance, as their requirements are different from those of 
people in camp settings or in rural areas”43. Regarding data on internal displacement there 
is no current “standard practice for establishing the end of displacement through 
data…IDPs may [then] remain in the data indefinitely because there are no clear criteria 
for assessing solutions…”44. However, the burden of data lies not just on the academic 
community but upon national governments as well. “The lack of government leadership 
or genuine participation in producing data can lead to a disconnect between data and 
decision making at the national level. This can be particularly damaging in protracted 
displacement crises where development interventions and planning are critical”45.  
 The durable solutions—repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration—have 
generated a significant amount of debate since their inception in 1998. However, in 
general it has been noted that states tend to be “excessively fixed on permanent physical 
returns of the displaced as ‘the’ solution to exile. This means that local integration and 
 
42 Christelle Cazabat, The importance of monitoring internal displacement, (Forced Migration Review, 
2018) 28. 
43 Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson, Achievements, challenges and recommendations: summary of 
outcomes of the GP10 Conference, 7. 
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resettlement have been downgraded…”46. The fixation on repatriation is a result of the 
political nature of displacement. “Return sends a strong message that the fear of 
persecution…is no longer present; repatriation can be a major vote of confidence…”47. 
However, while resettlement, and particularly reintegration has “been described as 
‘forgotten solutions’…at the national and international policy level, local integration is 
not so much forgotten as evaded”48. Despite national preferences for repatriation as 
opposed to resettlement or integration, it must be accepted that “some de facto integration 
will inevitably occur…Efforts should be focused not on trying to prevent the gradual 
development of such links, but on ensuring that they are productive for communities as a 
whole and are not undermined by precarious legal status…”49. In general, “planning for 
durable solutions must start soon after displacement occurs so as to facilitate the 
transition from humanitarian assistance to development…”50.   
 The intersection between internal displacement and state security is another vein 
in the academic literature. “It is essential to recognize that protracted refugee [and IDP] 
situations are closely linked to the phenomenon of fragile states…”51.  Furthermore, 
“long-term refugee [and IDP] populations are a critical element in ongoing conflict and 
instability, obstruct peace processes and undermine attempts at economic 
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development”52. In 2015, an “expert panel review of the UN peace operations state[d] 
that a lack of inclusion and continued marginalization…of displaced people ‘may 
threaten the stability of peace in the short and long term’. Neglecting durable solutions 
for IDPs, for instance, may ‘provoke the rejection of peace agreements by the displaced 
community, and nurture latent disputes and grievances that constrain peacebuilding”53. 
 Developing alongside internal displacement have been situations of protracted 
internal displacement. Protracted internal displacement is not to be confused with 
protracted refugee situations (PRS), although they share similar qualities. The UNHCR 
defines PRS as:  
[a] situation…in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable 
state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential 
economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. 
A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on 
external assistance…Protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. 
They are not inevitable but are rather the result of political action and 
inaction…54.  
As a crude measure protracted displacement is identified as “populations of 25,000 
persons or more who have been in exile for five or more years in developing countries”55.
 In contrasts to definitions of PRS, definitions of protracted internal displacement 
typically emphasize the agency and role of the state in creating the obstacles to durable 
solutions. In 2007, a UNHCR Brookings-Bern Expert Seminar on the Protracted IDP 
Situations noted that “[they] tend to be highly politicized: in some instances, a 
government may highlight the presence of IDPs to press for funding or political 
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advantage, while in others it may deny their existence to minimize attention domestically 
or internationally”56. At the Guiding Principles’ 10-Year anniversary conference in Oslo 
scholars found that “protracted displacement usually occurs as a result of unresolved 
conflicts and lack of political will amongst national governments, as well as insufficient 
support by international actors”57.  Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre released a report in 
which it was stated that “strong governments may seek to deliberately politicize 
protracted displacement, preventing formal resolution of a ‘crisis’ in order to protect high 
political interests”58. Perhaps most succinctly, Walter Kälin, former UN Secretary-
General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (2004-2010), and defined 
protracted internal displacement as “situations in which tangible progress towards 
durable solutions is slow or stalled for significant periods because IDPs are prevented 
from taking, or are unable to take, steps that allow them to progressively reduce the 
vulnerability, impoverishment, and marginalization they face as displaced people, in 
order to regain a self-sufficient and dignified life…”59. 
Orchard-Kälin Theoretical Framework 
In Forced Migration Review’s Special Edition celebrating the 20-year anniversary 
of the Guiding Principles, Phil Orchard published the article Implementing the Guiding 
Principles at the Domestic Level. In this article Orchard lists several factors of success 
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which have enabled states to implement effective laws and policies related to IDPs. 
Orchards three factors of success are: strong state capacity, accountability to other 
domestic institutions, and accountability to the domestic population. In addition to factors 
of success, Orchard also lists three factors which have led to policy failure: weak state 
capacity, a concern of reputation, and external pressure. This paper will analyze 
Orchard’s factor of success and failure within the context of Azerbaijan in order to 
highlight the nation’s strengths and weaknesses with respect to its ability to implement 
the Guiding Principles and effective IDP policies.      
 In 2018, Kälin published Guiding Principle 28: The Unfulfilled Promise to End 
Protracted Internal Displacement. This article re-examined instances of protracted 
internal displacement through Guiding Principle 28 which states: 
Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish 
conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons 
to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of 
habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such 
authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled 
internally displaced persons. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full 
participation of internally displaced persons in the planning and management of 
their return or resettlement and reintegration60.  
Examining protracted displacement through “Guiding Principle 28 and its legal basis, this 
contribution discusses the notion of durable solutions, conceptualizes the notion of 
protracted internal displacement and analyses the reasons why protracted internal 
displacement persists despite years of assistance. It ends with a proposal for addressing 
internal displacement that utilizes the UN’s New Way of Working”61.   
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 This paper specifically focuses and adopts three key aspects of Kälin’s article: the 
understanding of protracted internal displacement through Principle 28, the definition and 
conceptualization of protracted displacement, and the nine reasons posited for persistent 
protracted displacement: a weak humanitarian/development/peacebuilding nexus, a lack 
of security, political obstacles, obstacles to durable solutions related to economic, social, 
and cultural rights, obstacles related to civil and political rights, aid dependency, low 
levels of development, a lack of adequate normative and institutional frameworks at 
domestic and international levels, and finally, fragmented funding62.  
 This paper uses Kälin’s causes of protracted internal displacement to highlight the 
various ways durable solutions have been purposefully undermined in Azerbaijan. 
Applying this theoretical framework to Azerbaijan enables a reassessment of the case to 
emphasize that policy failures may in fact be part of an overarching strategy to undermine 
durable solutions.  
Applying the Kälin-Orchard Framework to Azerbaijan 
 
Factors of Success: Strong State Capacity 
 The first ‘factor of success’ listed by Orchard is ‘strong state capacity’, defined as 
a government with “necessary financial, practical, and symbolic resources”63. In his 
discussion of states with this factor of success, Orchard singles out Azerbaijan as a case 
in point. “In Azerbaijan, an initially weak response shifted as the government recognized 
that IDPs were likely to remain displaced in the long term. Starting in 2001, the 
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government worked actively to improve its legislative framework to ensure that IDPs 
were able to receive assistance and long-term housing, committing up to US$ 5.5 billion 
from the State Oil Fund”64. Analyzing Azerbaijan’s state capacity on a practical, 
financial, and symbolic level furthers Orchard’s assessment of the country.  
 On the practical level, Azerbaijan’s authoritarianism enables the country’s 
political leaders to make unilateral and sweeping decisions regarding everything from 
money to policy decisions. One way this can be demonstrated is by looking at where IDP 
policy originates. While the State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons is tasked with implementing IDP policy, “the Cabinet of Ministers of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan is the focal point for IDPs in the country. The mechanisms for 
implementing the complex framework of law and policy related to IDPs are regulated by 
its decisions as well as by decrees of the President of Azerbaijan”65. Presidential decrees 
have not only spawned the majority of IDP policy, but they have also initiated the 
majority of the social programs for IDPs. The elite control of IDP policy and funding 
bolstered by an authoritarian system of rule helps to enable a strong state capacity as it 
regards the mobilization of practical, and financial resources.     
 Financially, Azerbaijan’s state capacity is strengthened through its oil revenues. 
In late 1994, the nation “signed a contract to develop three oil fields with a consortium of 
companies…the deal was estimated to be worth eight billion dollars and was dubbed the 
‘contract of the century’”66. By the mid 2000’s Azerbaijan had installed the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, “it was the second longest pipeline in the world…BTC put Azerbaijan 
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on the world map…beloved by Western oil companies and politicians…it also gave 
Azerbaijan staggering new wealth. Azerbaijan was the world’s fastest growing economy 
in the years 2005—2008 and in 2008 its GDP had risen to $35 billion, having been just 
$1.3 billion in 1991”67. In addition to boosting the economy, the oil revenues enable 
Azerbaijan to avoid dependency on humanitarian aid, while also providing stable of 
funding revenues for the various social benefits awarded to IDPs.   
 On a symbolic level, Azerbaijan’s oil wealth has enabled the nation to engage in 
an arms race with Armenia. “Azerbaijani military spending had topped $3 billion and 
exceeded the entire Armenian state budget—an explicit goal the Azerbaijani leadership 
had set itself”68. “In almost every speech, the president presented the image of a strong 
and growing Azerbaijan set against a weak and declining Armenia”69. The largely 
symbolic threat of force against Armenia provides IDPs with hope that one day 
Azerbaijan will take back Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding seven provinces. 
         
Factors of Success: Accountability to Domestic Institutions 
Orchard defines his second factor of success as “accountability to other domestic 
intuitions, most notably the courts”70. Azerbaijan significantly lacks in accountability to 
other domestic institutions, especially with regards to the courts. In the most recent 
Freedom House report Azerbaijan was given a 0 out of 4 score when looking at the 
independence of the judiciary; “The judiciary is corrupt and subservient to the executive. 
Judges are appointed by the parliament on the proposal of the president. The courts’ lack 
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of political independence is especially evident in the many trumped-up or otherwise 
flawed cases brought against opposition figures, activists, and critical journalists71. On 
the issues of due process in civil and criminal matters, Azerbaijan also received a 0 out of 
4, a downward shift from previous years when the country was awarded 1 of 4. Freedom 
House notes that the score change was due to an “ongoing persecution and disbarment of 
human rights lawyers [which] has deprived dissidents and activists of access to 
counsel”72. In 2017, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE), of which 
Azerbaijan is a member, expressed concern regarding the state of the nation’s judiciary, 
“and urged reforms to ensure the independence of the judiciary”73. As a member of the 
CoE, Azerbaijani citizens are able to have cases heard by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). In 2017, the ECtHR found that political activist, Ilgar Mammadov, had 
been imprisoned unlawfully, after the ruling “the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers [sic] triggered unprecedented proceedings against Azerbaijan for failing to 
implement the court’s judgment in Mammadov’s case”74. Azerbaijan’s judiciary is 
neither free, nor independent, and as such there is a significant lack of accountability 
within the nation.  
Factors of Success: Accountability to the Domestic Population 
Orchard also finds that “accountability to the domestic population can also drive 
the implementation process” toward success75. However, public accountability in 
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Azerbaijan is very weak, with particular regard to voting and public expression. During 
Azerbaijan’s 2018 presidential election the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) branch of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) reported “numerous serious violations, including indications of ballot box 
stuffing, multiple voting, and series of seemingly identical signatures”76. It was further 
noted that the election: 
took place within a restrictive political environment and under a legal framework 
that curtails fundamental rights and freedoms, which are pre-requisites for 
genuine democratic elections. Against this background and in the absence of 
pluralism, including in the media, this election lacked genuine competition. Other 
candidates refrained from directly challenging or criticizing the incumbent, and 
distinction was not made between his campaign and official activities77. 
Unfair elections follow a pattern which emerged in 1993, where the result of President 
Heydar Aliev’s election was “preordained and [where] he was awarded an improbable 
98.8 percent of the vote”78.         
 The freedom of expression is another measure of public accountability which is 
curtailed in Azerbaijan. Freedom House gave Azerbaijan a 1 of 4 score regarding the 
freedom of individuals to express their personal political views without fear of retribution 
or surveillance. Freedom House found that “law enforcement bodies monitor private 
telephone and online communications—particularly of activists, political figures, and 
foreign nationals—without judicial oversight. The escalation of government persecution 
of critics and their families has undermined the assumption of privacy among ordinary 
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residents and eroded the openness of private discussion”79. Other aspects of free 
expression, including a free media are also curtailed in Azerbaijan. Freedom House gave 
Azerbaijan a 0 of 4 score, noting “Constitutional guarantees for press freedom are 
routinely and systematically violated, as the government works to maintain a tight grip on 
the information landscape. Defamation remains a criminal offense. Journalists—and their 
relatives—face harassment, violence, and intimidation by authorities”80.   
Factors of Failure: Weak State Capacity 
In addition to his three factors of success, Orchard also distilled three factors 
contributing to failure in implementing the Guiding Principles and a cohesive IDP policy 
framework, the first of which is a weak state capacity. Orchard defined weak state 
capacity as a situation where “the government lacks the necessary financial, practical and 
symbolic resources, and may also occur due to domestic opposition from within and 
outside the government”81. While Azerbaijan’s state capacity is quite robust, it has a 
particular weakness as it concerns internal domestic opposition. Nagorno-Karabakh and 
IDPs are very sensitive and potentially explosive issues within Azerbaijan, this is the one 
area in which grassroots opposition to government policy has enacted major change. In 
the beginning of 1992, the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly was captured by Armenia. 
Khojaly wasn’t a significant strategic loss, but a significant loss of human life as 
hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians were indiscriminately killed as they fled from the town. 
“The Khojaly killings triggered a crisis in Baku. Azerbaijanis denounced their 
government for not protecting the town…When the Azerbaijani parliament met on March 
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3, opposition deputies demanded that a film [of Kohjaly] be shown in the chamber. ‘The 
first frames of the film stated rolling—and the ten minutes changed the history of the 
country’”82. In the wake of the images from Khojaly the ruling party collapsed. In 2006, a 
peace process on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and its IDPs stalled as a result of 
“almost no public demand for peace…The two leaders [of Azerbaijan and Armenia] used 
the conflict for domestic purposes, but it also used them, remaining an issue over which it 
was politically risky to declare compromise”83. Governments rise and fall with the 
developments in Karabakh, the potential consequences of public political fallout have 
been tempering force on the ability and willingness of Azerbaijani leaders to implement 
effective IDP policy.  
Factors of Failure: Reputational Concerns 
Orchard’s factors of failure can also occur “where governments driven primarily 
by reputational concerns decide to make a strategic rhetorical commitment to the Guiding 
Principles but have no plan to follow through on implementation”84. The Azerbaijani 
government has not made any explicit public reference to the Guiding Principles. 
However, in 2006 the Council of Europe, adopted the recommendation that 
“governments of member states be guided, when formulating their internal legislation and 
practice, and when faced with internal displacement, by the following principles: The 
United Nations guiding principles and other relevant international instruments of human 
rights or humanitarian law apply to all internally displaced persons…”85. As a member of 
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the CoE, the body’s adoption of the Guiding Principles reflects commitments and 
obligations upon the Azerbaijani state. However, as noted by UN Special Rapporteur 
Chaloka Beyani, “the body of legislation put in place by the government to address 
internal displacement has essentially remained the same since the previous visits of the 
Special Rapporteur’s predecessors” in 2008 and 199886.  
Factor of Failure: External Engagement 
As for the third factor of failure, Orchard states that “external institutional 
engagement may persuade governments to create policies or laws where they otherwise 
may not have taken action; without further pressure, however, there will be little follow-
through implementation”87. Of considerable concern to international actors such as the 
United Nations, has been the state of IDP housing and living conditions. The Azerbaijani 
state is quick to highlight the number and quality of new IDP settlements, press releases 
from the State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
include headlines such as “IDPs from Lachin were relocated in two out of three 
settlements for 645 families newly built and commissioned…”88, “Six buildings 
containing 250 apartments were commissioned for IDPs in Ujar, and a building 
containing 80 apartments in Goychay…”89, and “New residential complex was 
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commissioned for 563 internally displaced families in Kurdamir”90. However, while 
public conversations focus on the number and stated quality of these IDP settlements, 
there has been little follow through in addressing underlying problems such as the 
location of such settlements “in isolated areas, a long distance from essential services, 
employment opportunities and administrative authorities…[which] creates a sense of 
physical insecurity and isolation for IDPs from the local population, but also affects the 
ability of IDPs to become self-reliant”91. The issue of IDP housing has been a cause of 
concern since the first United Nations visits in 1998. However, since 1998 there have 
only been a handful of high-level visits to the nation, as a result implementation of 
recommendations has been slow and by a large extent superficial.     
 In the case of Azerbaijan, I argue that the nation has none of Orchard’s factors of 
success, and to some extent all the factors of failure. I would further argue that in 
Azerbaijan a ‘strong state capacity’ should not be classified as a factor of success, but 
rather a factor of failure. Due to the country’s governance system, control of IDP policy 
is placed almost exclusively with the executive and a small body of elites, who are 
particularly vulnerable to changes in this policy. This leaves an already politicized issue 
in the hands of those who have a vested political interest in maintaining their positions, 
and as a result the status quo, as significant changes would be a considerable gamble to 
those in power. The presence of these factors of failure have contributed to protracted 
displacement in Azerbaijan but have also enabled the nation’s leadership to actively 
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undermine efforts towards durable solutions. This paper will now move towards a 
discussion of Kälin’s causes to protracted displacement to highlight examples of policies 
which have purposefully hindered durable solutions.    
Weak humanitarian/development/peacebuilding nexus 
In his 2018 article, Walter Kälin describes contributing causes of protracted 
internal displacement. The first cause discussed is a ‘weak 
humanitarian/development/peacebuilding nexus’ described as a situation wherein the 
ministry tasked with handling IDPs “is a separate ministry with no links to the line 
ministries in charge of developmental issues, or, alternatively, displacement issues are 
delegated to a refugee commission or similar unit that has neither the capacity, nor the 
experience authority to invest effectively in durable solutions”92. Although previously 
mentioned, it is worth noting that in Azerbaijan, the State Committee for Affairs of 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons is the agency tasked with handling IDP 
related issues. However, while the State Committee can make recommendations on IDP 
policy, decisions regarding policy are made by the President, National Parliament [Mili 
Mejilis], or Cabinet of Ministers, a 35-member body which includes the head of the State 
Committee. “According to the Government, a total of 95 orders and decrees were signed 
by the President, 357 resolutions and decrees were approved by the Cabinet of Ministers 
and 33 laws were adopted by the National Parliament” regarding the status of IDPs93. 
 This administrative structure puts the impetus of policy decision making outside 
the State Committee, however, depending on the political standing of the head of the 
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State Committee this structure doesn’t necessarily sideline the ministry. In fact, the 
former head of the State Committee, Ali S. Hasanov (1998—2018), was a strong ally of 
the presidents of Azerbaijan, being of the same administrative region and describing 
himself as an “Aliyevist”94. However, in 2018 Hasanov was replaced by Rovshan 
Rzayev, a Baku native whose experience with IDPs extended as far as being an elected 
member of the Board of Director of the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Region of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ACNKSU), a body devoted to educating “the 
public on the historical roots of the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict and the large-scale 
measures taken by the President to resolve them…[and restoring] the territorial integrity 
of Azerbaijan and help the displaced population return to their native lands”95. Moreover, 
it should be noted that although Rzayev was elected, the ACNKSU’s “22-member 
executive board was ‘elected’ in 2009 by a ‘congress’ of 350 IDPs, most of whom were 
chosen by the government or government-controlled executive committees”96.  It is 
currently difficult to determine the effectiveness of Rzayev in recommending and 
advocating for effective IDP policies. However, given that one of the stated aims of the 
ACNKSU is to educate the public on the President’s initiatives it seems unlikely that the 
current head of the State Committee will have the capacity or authority to invest in 
durable solutions.  
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Lack of Security 
Another cause of protracted internal displacement is a lack of security, defined as 
landmines, unexploded ordinances, and “the continued presence of military or other 
armed actors…”97. The 1994 ceasefire signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, neither ended 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, nor removed troops from their positions, it simply ended 
active military operations between the two nations. The border between the two military 
positions is known as the Line of Contact98, where “around thirty thousand soldiers [face] 
each other on either side…the ceasefire [is] frequently broken, with the only international 
presence being six monitors of the [Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe] 
mandated to make two inspection visits a month”99. Ceasefire violations reached a high in 
April 2016, creating the ‘April War’ wherein several dozen people died, and more than 
300 casualties were reported100. The presence of the unresolved conflict is a real physical 
threat to Azerbaijani citizens living near the border, and to the IDPs who live near the 
border.          
 However, the lack of security extends beyond the presence of armed actors, and to 
the threats and arms race the Azerbaijani state has initiated against Armenia. As 
previously mentioned, it was an explicit goal of the nation’s political leadership to have 
the military budget exceed the Armenian state budget, but Azerbaijan has also engaged in 
purchasing “at least $4bn worth of arms from Russia”101. In response to the ‘April War’, 
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev made the following veiled threat to Armenia “I am 
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sure that none of the enemy's provocations will remain unanswered. The enemy will 
continue to receive an adequate response. The Azerbaijani army is capable of doing that. 
The sons of Azerbaijan are defending the homeland, fighting for their country and 
becoming martyrs”102. The arms race and veiled threats constitute a very real security risk 
which has a mitigating effect on the possibility of durable solutions by keeping the 
appearance that displacement is a temporary situation, ready to change as the Azerbaijani 
military forces prepare to retake Karabakh. The ever-present potential for return is one of 
the primary reasons durable solutions have not been reached.  
Obstacles related to economic, social, and cultural rights 
Kälin notes that obstacles to durable solutions are often related to economic, 
social, and cultural rights, defined as a “lack of access to livelihoods, adequate housing, 
education, health services, or psychosocial support…IDPs may face discrimination in 
accessing labour markets as displaced people or they may lack the necessary skills, 
contacts, or expertise to gain employment, hindering their ability to find livelihoods and 
leading to high levels of unemployment that can take years to overcome”103. For the 
purpose of brevity, this section will focus primarily on the economic and livelihood 
obstacles within Azerbaijan.         
 As a group IDPs face higher rate of economic vulnerability. In Azerbaijan, “the 
evidence is that twenty years after their displacement, IDPs have yet to overcome the 
specific impacts of displacement and marginalization…”104. In 2018, it was reported that 
the unemployment rate of IDPs was 15%, whereas the unemployment rate of the non-IDP 
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population was approximately 5%105. Furthermore, it was found that 54% of all IDP 
household members were economically inactive, as compared to 36% of non-IDPs106. A 
World Bank survey suggested that “68 percent of respondent families had various forms 
of [household] debt”107. Due to their particular vulnerabilities, the Azerbaijani 
government has created an extensive package of state benefits and exemptions from 
“service fees such as electricity, natural gas and drinking water…IDPs are also exempted 
from a number of taxes and fees including fees for the issuance of their identity cards; or 
for submitting court applications or for their State license plates and driver’s license. 
They also benefit from reduced taxation including for income taxes”108. These state 
benefits account for the “main source of income for more than 70 per cent of IDPs”109. 
However, “monthly allowances and other assistance for IDPs, including new housing are 
dependent on their continued presence at their government registered address…IDPs felt 
that their freedom of movement was restricted, in particular because access to assistance 
and free housing tied them to their registered address and thus hindered them from 
moving to search for employment elsewhere”110.     
 The linking of state benefits to an IDP’s official residence is not only a restriction 
on movement, but a practical matter of logistical issues as well because many IDP 
settlements are “located in isolated areas, a long distance from essential services, 
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employment opportunities and administrative authorities…”111. Despite the logistical 
issues, the World Bank found that IDPs had a number of strategies to deal with this 
situation.  
When seeking casual day labor, they may travel into a city for a day or few days 
at a time and look for temporary accommodation while they do so but return to 
their place of residence after each spell of work. This strategy does, however, 
raise the transaction costs of casual labor as it entails paying transportation costs 
and rent. Other IDPs appeared to maintain two residences, one informal in a city 
as foothold for economic opportunities and one formal in the place of their 
registration112. 
When the World Bank conducted an interview with an IDP from the western city of 
Göygöl, about these strategies, the young man said, “I went to Baku to earn money. But 
almost 60—70 percent of what I earned there was spent on accommodation and food and 
the rest of the money was so miserable, not enough to keep the family, so it was not at all 
profitable for me to work there”113. For IDPs wishing to generate an income by starting a 
small business, there are “difficulties in securing loans due to their lack of property 
assets”114. As their displacement is considered temporary by the state, IDPs living in 
federally provided housing or land do not actually own those assets.    
 As Kälin notes access to a sustainable livelihood also includes expertise, skills, 
and contacts. With regards to expertise and skills IDPs can face a barrier in that “one 
third of IDPs were farmers before displacement and most other IDPs were employed in 
professions linked to agricultural production, many on collective farms. As a result, there 
has been and continues to be a serious disjuncture between IDP skills and their 
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environment…the older generation of IDPs does not have…the experience to maximize 
income opportunities in urban environments”115. This gap is compounded in the fact that 
“land allocated to IDPs tends to be relatively infertile, which has further limited their 
ability to generate an income”116.        
 Access to employment can be further complicated by a lack of available social 
capital. As a young man working in Baku explains, “If you don’t have education and 
professional skills, it is difficult to get a job. But if you don’t have someone powerful 
behind you, it is even more difficult”117.  In Azerbaijan social capital is critical to 
securing a job, and “yet it is in the field of social capital that IDPs felt that they were 
particularly disadvantaged and vulnerable”118. This vulnerability felt by IDPs is due to 
the fact that the “inter-community networks IDPs had with non-IDPs were often more 
tenuous because they had been settled in places where the families of others, not their 
own, held influence and power. Without those connections, IDPs often felt that their 
access to jobs and work was almost hopelessly constrained”119.      
 Within his category of ‘obstacles to durable solutions related to economic, social, 
and cultural rights’, Kälin also considers IDPs access to health services. As reported by 
the UN Special Rapporteur for IDPs in 2015, Azerbaijan has “326 health facilities in the 
districts occupied by IDPs, served by 700 physicians and 2,300 nurses…[but] difficulties 
remain for IDPs in accessing health services owing to the limited availability of 
services…demand for unofficial payment, and the often poor quality of the services 
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offered”120. Furthermore, “when visiting certain settlements, even new ones, the Special 
Rapporteur indeed noticed the lack of a systematic approach with regard to IDP access to 
health care. Very often, mobile clinics cover specific areas and inside settlements, only a 
small facility is available, sometimes without any practitioner present on a regular 
basis”121.    
Aid Dependency 
Aid dependency, “an overall stagnation in displaced people’s progress toward 
self-sufficiency”, occurs when “IDPs are forced to remain in camp or camp-like settings 
without freedom of movement or are otherwise deprived of access to livelihoods” 122. 
Moreover, Kälin notes that “humanitarian action is not designed to enable long-term 
sustainable development outcomes. Rather, short-term humanitarian grants are used as an 
‘expensive and ineffective safety net of first resort’ and therefore contribute to aid 
dependency when they substitute for measures to reduce vulnerability over multi-year 
planning cycles”123.          
 Several major international organizations have remarked upon a ‘dependency 
syndrome’ among Azerbaijani IDPs. The World Bank found that “A narrative of the 
importance of self-help…is strikingly low among IDPs in Azerbaijan. After more than 
two decades in displacement…subsidized by the Government, as a population they have 
become orientated towards and expectant of policy as determining their overall survival 
 
120 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 
Chaloka Beyani, 11. 
121 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 
Chaloka Beyani, 11. 
122 Walter Kälin, Guiding Principle 28: The Unfulfilled Promise to End Protracted Displacement, 260. 
123 Ibid., 260. 
35 
 
and conditions, rather than what they might do for themselves”124. Chaloka Beyani, the 
UN Special Rapporteur for IDPs, noted that “the dependency syndrome engendered 
among IDPs persists, which the Special Rapporteur’s predecessor had noticed during his 
previous visit [in 2008]. That seems to be due to a combination of factors such as 
regarding the situation of IDPs as being temporary, the high social protection which does 
not encourage them to become self-reliant and livelihood activates which are too low 
income to ensure self-sustainability”125. Some of the Azerbaijani IDPs interviewed by the 
World Bank stated, “We need more support from the Government: We need housing and 
job to live adequately”, and “We need to live, not just survive till we get back to our 
homes. It would be good if the government-built houses for us here, provide us with jobs, 
and increase pensions for old people”126.      
Fragility and Low Levels of Development 
Durable solutions are can also be impacted in “contexts facing overall fragility 
and low levels of development”127. According to Kälin, lows levels of development 
include the absence of infrastructure, an insufficient access to basic services, and a weak 
governmental presence. However, Kälin also notes that low levels of development are 
typically caused by the perception that displacement is temporary. “Despite evidence that 
displacement is likely to last for an extended period of time, political leaders often 
perceive, or choose to present, displacement as a temporary situation. Thus, authorities 
omit IDPs from local economic and social development programmes…”128. Presenting 
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displacement not only impacts governmental development programs, but also impacts 
IDPs ability or willingness to invest in accommodations, careers, and relationships which 
may be temporary.        
 Azerbaijan has consistently referred to displacement as a temporary situation, 
most poignantly through its 2005 ‘Great Return’ plan. Under this plan “UN bodies and 
the [International Committee of the Red Cross] would help ensure initial rehabilitation 
and social needs in collaboration with the government, while the World Bank would fund 
part of the reconstruction process. Although local NGOs are aware of this, they have nor 
been involved in its drafting. IDPs and returnees generally say they are unaware of any 
government strategy to return them safely”129. However, despite the fact that international 
organizations from the UN to the World Bank are supposedly involved with the ‘Great 
Return’ plan, UN Special Rapporteur Chaloka Beyani was “under the impression that the 
plan is yet to be made public and shared with relevant stakeholders including United 
Nations agencies in the country”, despite the fact that “State officials extensively referred 
to the Great Return Programme announced…as of 2005”130.    
 While IDPs may be unaware of the Great Return plan, the sense that their 
displacement is a temporary situation has had a lasting impact. An IDP interviewed by 
Brookings said “If the government would build us a house, if we knew that it was ours, 
we would build ourselves a life. We would take out loans and buy solid building 
materials for a house. But we do not know if they are going to resettle us tomorrow and 
we do not want to lose what we would build. Because of uncertainty we have been living 
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here for 18 years and only have been patching up the crumbling walls of mud brick 
houses from time to time”131. Another IDP noted that “we do not have certainty in our 
lives. They, the government, keep telling us that we will be relocated. People live with 
the hope that they will either return or will be relocated to better housing conditions. And 
as we wait, life passes by”132.   
Political Obstacles 
According to Kälin, political obstacles to ending protracted internal displacement 
“extend beyond failures to resolve longstanding armed conflict that undermine returns, 
particularly where a State has lost control over part of its territory. For instance, the 
politicization of internal displacement situations can be an obstacle to supporting local 
integration as a viable option for IDPs to find a durable solution, because ‘political 
decision makers calculate that continued pressure to return will uphold their territorial 
claims’”133. Kälin further notes that within such contexts, “government policies often 
limit IDPs access to housing and basic services, thus keeping IDPs in situations of 
protracted displacement even though local integration would be a more realistic and 
adequate policy response”134.        
 The Guiding Principles outlines three durable solutions—return, resettlement, and 
integration—but in the case of Azerbaijan, the government “has been reluctant to 
promote local integration as a long-term solution for IDPs. The government’s concern is 
that IDP integration into local communities may render their return to their original 
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homes in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as less likely in the future, thereby weakening 
Azerbaijan’s claim to sovereignty over these territories”135. The refusal of the Azerbaijani 
government to recognize local integration as a practical durable solution, is most clearly 
reflected in the country’s IDP housing and education policies.    
 IDP housing in Azerbaijan tends to be separated from the non-IDP population in 
terms of facilities, services, and distance. This is the result of the government’s desire “to 
maintain social cohesion” within IDP communities such that return will be easier136. 
During an interview with an official from the State Committee for Affairs of Refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons, members of the Brookings Institution were told: “We 
are striving hard to preserve the structure that existed prior to occupation to make the 
return easy. Otherwise, [once return is possible] we would have to build up everything 
from scratch”137. The policies which separate IDPs from the non-IDP population serves 
to not only hinder local integration, but also “reinforces the sense that [the IDPs’] 
residence is temporary, with return being the only solution available to them”138. UN 
Special Rapporteur Beyani noted that “the discourse remains that IDPs are only 
temporarily ‘hosted’ in those settlements until they are able to return to their place of 
origin”139.           
 The policies and discourses of temporary displacement have had very real effects 
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on the local integration of IDPs. “Local urban residents [sic] consider that despite the 
long history of displacement, IDPs have remained ‘alien’, not fully integrated into the 
host community”140. The World Bank found that IDPs’ “bridging social capital with non-
IDPs would seem to be weaker…[because] many IDPs tended to live in designated IDP 
settlements and apart from the non-displaced, decreasing the number of opportunities to 
contact and connect with the non-displaced”141. Perhaps the social isolation of IDPs was 
best summed up by an IDP woman from Khojaly, “We do not feel like full-fledged 
members of the society. We are ‘non-tenured’ members of the society. As the say, ‘Away 
from the eyes, away from the heart’”142.       
 The failure to fully integrate IDPs and non-IDPs has exacerbated tensions 
between the two communities. “While on a national level there was a strong ideology of 
support for IDPs, it was tempered by a widespread perception that in some regards IDPs 
were responsible for the loss of their lands because they had not put up greater resistance 
to protect them”143. As one IDP in the western city of Ganja reports: “I had a dispute with 
one local and he told me: I give thanks to the Armenians for what they have done to you, 
you deserve even more than that”144. Another IDP in Baku told the World Bank, “I feel 
very depressed about being an IDP. Sometimes when I am on the bus, I hear people 
talking about ‘gachgyn’ [Azerbaijani word for IDP; qaçqın] with disdain and irritation, I 
often face things like this. Even if people don’t say it to you openly, they talk about IDPs 
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in this way behind you”145.        
 However, beyond the negative perceptions resulting from the events in Karabakh, 
there are negative perceptions of IDPs due to the official discourse on IDPs which depicts 
an image of them as “pitiful and miserable and in need of [sic] special assistance…any 
mismatch between the public image of IDPs  and their everyday reality causes discontent 
and a somewhat envious reaction by some local residents who resent the benefits 
received by IDPs…”146. As an IDP living in Barda explains, “Personally, I was always 
very proud of originally being from Agdam [one of the occupied territories]. Now I often 
feel ashamed and try even to say that I am not from Agdam because people will call me 
‘gachgyn’. This word is so bitter and humiliating to hear”147. Interviews of IDPs 
conducted by the Brookings Institution, further emphasize the tensions regarding the 
difference between discourse and reality, “They think that if you are an IDP you should 
be wearing rubbish. When you dress nicely and have something new on, they wonder: 
‘How come you have [a] new dress, where did you get money for that?”148. Another IDP 
said, “Many people visit us and say: ‘How come you are an IDP and have an air 
conditioner?’ They don’t think that it is impossible to deal with 40 degree [104 degrees 
Fahrenheit] in a house without proper windows”149.      
 The effects of Azerbaijan’s refusal to recognize local integration as a durable 
solution are also apparent in the nation’s education policy. The majority of IDP children 
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are educated separately from non-IDP children, attending ‘IDP schools’. In 2008, Walter 
Kälin, the then UN Special Rapporteur for IDPs, “learned that the Government was 
trying to preserve the social fabric of communities, which would eventually facilitate 
reintegration upon return. This led to some schools in Baku accommodating regional 
schools from Fizuli, Kelbejar, or Lachin [occupied territories] so that in effect two 
schools were housed in one building and classes were held in shifts or in separate 
classrooms”150. In a follow up visit to Azerbaijan in 2014, UN Special Rapporteur 
Beyani, found that “around 60 per cent of IDP children are educated separately” from 
non-IDP children151.         
 It should be noted that the separated education of IDP children is generally 
preferred by IDP parents. “Parents claim to prefer their children be taught by IDP 
teachers who maintain the memories of displacement through lessons, song and dance, 
activities and visual aids meant to preserve ‘a sense of history about who we are and what 
we suffered’”152. It should be further noted that “there are no restrictions on IDP 
attendance in local schools”153. However, the choice of IDP parents “may be limited due 
to distance or lack of funds”154. It should also be noted that the lack of integration 
between IDPs and non-IDPs even affects IDP children, “…my child goes to the local 
school and he is called ‘gachgyn’ there. It traumatizes a child’s psychological state and 
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makes his feel second rate”155.          
 The separation of IDP and non-IDP children has created quality disparities. 
“Many IDP schools were established in sub-standard building where a major issue is 
heating during the winter. In cold months teachers and students do not take off their coats 
or hat and classrooms require the use of multiple heaters to stay warm”156. Additionally, 
“low teacher salaries and continued use of outdated teaching methods [sic] negatively 
affect the quality of education. Students in some schools revealed that they sometimes 
feel unsafe because some teachers used corporal punishment and threatened them…”157. 
While the Azerbaijani government is attempting to address some of these concerns, the 
“segregation reinforces IDP stigmatization and their isolation from the broader 
community and encourages a nostalgia for the past, hampering their integration and 
adding to their precarious social position”158.  
Obstacles related to civil and political rights 
Another of Kälin’s reasons for protracted displacement is those obstacles related 
to civil and political rights, which encompasses a variety of situations, one of which is 
“when IDPs are unable to register as residents in areas where they found refuge, thus 
limiting their access to rights, including the right to vote in local elections”159. In 
Azerbaijan, “Administrative structures from in and around Nagorno-Karabakh were 
retained and moved to areas of high concentrations of IDPs…[this has enabled the 
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government to] maintain constituencies in IDP areas of origin, in readiness for the time 
when the return of IDPs will become possible”160. While “IDPs have full rights to 
participate in parliamentary and presidential elections”161, they “are not allowed to vote 
in municipal council elections where they presently (temporarily) reside…”162. 
Furthermore, IDPs cannot “stand as candidates in municipal elections in their areas of 
displacement. However, IDPs can run as candidates and vote in municipal elections, but 
only in their areas of origin”163. Alongside, their in-exile local governments, IDPs also 
have some political representation through the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-
Karabakh Region of the Republic of Azerbaijan164. However, as the membership of this 
body was primarily decided by the Azerbaijani government, its credibility and ability to 
effectively advocate for IDPs is suspect. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDCM) has found that Azerbaijan’s policies on political participation have made IDPs 
“unable to campaign on local issues they deem important. Their inability to take part in 
local politics limits their access to local government resources and narrows their options 
for addressing their displacement-related needs”165. The World Bank found that 
“allowing IDPs voting rights in their place of residence could improve the accountability 
of local officials to IDP issues”166.       
 Beneath the auspices of obstacles related to civil and political rights, Kälin found 
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that “discrimination linked to a conflict can hinder sustainable return…”167. While the 
issue of return seems relatively remote at the current time, there are serious concerns 
regarding IDP return which are beginning to develop, with particular regard to youth. As 
of 2010, it was reported that “86 percent of IDPs in Azerbaijan live in urban areas, 
mainly in Baku and Sumgait [two major cities]”168. Return to largely underdeveloped and 
rural areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories may not appeal to the 
younger generation of IDPs, or the children of IDPs who have grown up in the major 
urban cities; “some younger IDPs [sic] say they would prefer to stay in their current 
places of residence even id return were a viable option”169. In an interview with 
International Crisis Group (ICG), “some younger IDPs [admitted] that though the wish to 
see their old lands, they may not want to return permanently. Some young people are 
divided over ‘wanting to get a job and have a normal life’ or ‘returning to our 
homeland’”170. While the possibility of return may not be immediately present (if ever), 
the current orientation of government policies does not appear to be oriented toward 
‘sustainable return’. Moreover, it is unclear if the Azerbaijani state is prepared to handle 
situations of IDPs who do not wish to return. 
Normative Domestic and International Frameworks 
Kälin also lists a lack of adequate normative and institutional frameworks at the 
domestic and international levels as a contributing factor to protracted internal 
displacement. The domestic level institutions have been discussed elsewhere, but there 
 
167 Walter Kälin, Guiding Principle 28: The Unfulfilled Promise to End Protracted Displacement, 259. 
168 Yulia Gureyeva-Aliyeva et al., Can you be an IDP for Twenty Years: A Comparative Field Study on the 
Protection Needs and Attitudes Towards Displacement and IDPs and Host Communities in Azerbaijan, 6. 
169 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Azerbaijan: After some 20 years, IDPs still face barriers to 
self-reliance, 1. 
170 International Crisis Group, Tackling Azerbaijan’s IDP Burden, 11. 
45 
 
are important international level institutional frameworks to discuss in connection with 
IDPs. In Azerbaijan, it is difficult to separate the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and IDPs, 
as the state has worked hard to make one dependent on the other. As such it has become 
imperative to “reach a peaceful settlement to the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict in order to 
resolve the protracted situation of displacement, which has lasted more than 20 years in 
Azerbaijan”171. Peace negotiations regarding the situation in Karabakh are under the 
auspices of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has 
delegated the negotiations to a smaller body known as the Minsk Group, which includes 
the presidents of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and three co-chair nations: France, 
Russia, and the United States. However, despite twenty years of negotiations and 
diplomacy, the talks are at a stalemate. “The problem is not in the quality of [sic] 
diplomats or the sophistication of the drafts of various documents they compose. The 
problem is in the structure of the negotiation process. The presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan have shaped a highly private and confidential format which excuses them of 
any political accountability before their publics”172. This format encourages neither 
president to break the tenuous status quo which has been achieved during the past twenty-
years of ‘no war, no peace’. In 2006, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group released this 
statement: 
As co-chairs, we have reached the limits of our creativity in the identification, 
formulation and finalization of these principles. We do not believe additional 
alternatives advanced by the mediators through additional meetings with the sides 
will produce a different result…The parties would be well-served at this point by 
allowing their publics to engage in a robust discussion of the many viewpoints on 
these issues…We see no point right now in continuing the intensive shuttle 
 
171 United Nations, “Peace in Azerbaijan urgently needed to resolve protracted displacement– UN expert”, 
United Nations. 5/27/2014, https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/05/469372-peace-azerbaijan-urgently-
needed-resolve-protracted-displacement-un-expert. 
172 Thomas de Waal, Black Garden, 319. 
46 
 
diplomacy we have engaged in over the past several months. We also see no 
further point in initiating further presidential meetings until the sides demonstrate 
enough political will to overcome their remaining differences…We will be ready 
to reengage if indeed the parties decide to pursue the talks with the political will 
that has thus far been lacking173. 
Since 2006, there has been movement in negotiations, but deadlock and stalemate seem 
to continuously stymie all diplomatic efforts. At the international level, the normative and 
institutional frameworks attempting to achieve peace have failed to do so, and as a result 
the IDPs, refugees, and other impacted populations on both sides continue to live in 
limbo.   
Fragmented Funding 
 Kälin’s final contributing factor of protracted internal displacement is 
‘fragmented funding’, a situation which occurs when “short-term fragmented strategies to 
address protracted displacement prevail over longer-term, holistic programming, [which 
can create the risk of] exclusion, poverty, degradation, possible radicalization, and new 
conflict…”174. Azerbaijan’s significant oil revenues enable the country to avoid funding 
shortages of social programs, and indeed have contributed to the creation of an extensive 
social welfare package for IDPs. However, there does not appear to be a holistic, long-
term development program for IDPs, instead strategies overwhelmingly focus on meeting 
immediate needs such as housing, access to water, education, and health services. 
However, far more research is needed to before definitive conclusion can be made as to 
whether or not fragmented funding is present in Azerbaijan, or to what extent it may be 
impacting government programming.   
 
173 Philip Remler, Chained to the Caucasus: Peacemaking in Karabakh, 1987–2012, (International Peace 
Institute, 2016), 95—96.  
174 Walter Kälin, Guiding Principle 28: The Unfulfilled Promise to End Protracted Displacement, 261. 
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Preventing Durable Solutions 
 The Orchard-Kälin emphasizes the agency and responsibility of individual states 
in resolving situations of protracted internal displacement within their borders. 
Application of the framework to both, specific policies and the overall legislative 
structure within Azerbaijan, and revealed two broad policy categories: policies which 
have an overall effect of undermining durable solutions and those policies which are 
intended to undermine and prevent durable solutions.      
 The policies classified as having an overall effect of undermining durable 
solutions are a weak humanitarian/development/peacebuilding nexus, aid dependency, 
and fragmented funding. Azerbaijan’s weak humanitarian/development/peacebuilding 
nexus, evidenced through its multiple legislative and policy structures has an 
undermining effect on implementing durable solutions by creating multiple avenues 
through which IDP policy can be developed and implemented. The numerous legislative 
structures diminish the importance of the primary agency tasked with handling IDP 
issues, the State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 
impedes the ministry’s ability to effectively advocate for cohesive and comprehensive 
policies. Moreover, the recent appointment of Rovshan Rzayev further diminishes the 
authority and abilities of the State Committee as Rzayev lacks meaningful experience in 
IDP affairs. Rzayev’s close alignment with the President also diminishes the 
independence of the State Committee, creating the sense that the State Committee is an 
extension of the executive office.        
 Aid dependency and fragmented funding have the overall effect of undermining 
durable solutions by decreasing the ability of IDPs to move freely within the country and 
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hindering their ability to integrate into their host communities. Additionally, the aid 
dependency has had the effect of creating specific victimized social roles for the IDP 
population which has served to emphasize the distance and difference between IDPs and 
the non-IDP population. These policies have the overall effect of preventing durable 
solutions by creating an environment in which return becomes the only resolution to 
protracted internal displacement.         
 Application of the Orchard-Kälin framework also revealed policies which are 
purposefully designed and intended to undermine durable solutions. This category 
includes the lack of security, obstacles related to economic, social, and cultural rights, 
low development and fragility, political obstacles, obstacles related to political and civil 
rights, and normative domestic and international frameworks. These policies differ from 
the effecting policies in that they are actively working to hinder, undermine, and prevent 
IDPs from reaching durable solutions which are conflict with the state’s desire for return. 
 The lack of security, specifically the threats of violence against the Armenian 
state, the publicized arms race, and ceasefire violations give demonstrable action to the 
notion that return is imminent, and displacement temporary. Economic, social, and 
cultural obstacles have restricted IDP movement by tying state benefits to isolated IDP 
settlements, which has also prevented local integration. In the case of low development 
and fragility the constant assurances from Azerbaijani state officials, including the 
President, have contributed to a national narrative that return is not only imminent, but 
inevitable. This temporary displacement narrative has undermined local integration, and 
economic development of the IDP population. Political obstacles have seen the state 
create separate housing and educational institutions for the IDP population which has 
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created a social and physical distance between IDPs and non-IDP, preventing local 
integration. Obstacles regarding political and civil rights have limited IDP voices, as their 
enfranchisement is limited to constituencies-in-exile, further hindering local integration. 
In the case of normative domestic and institutional frameworks within Azerbaijan, it 
becomes clear that the absence of transparency regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
has granted Azerbaijani state officials a monopoly on information which can be, and is 
manipulated to fit the purposes of the state, which is to actively undermine and prevent 
all other durable solutions other than return.       
   
A Tale of Two Cases: Georgia and Azerbaijan 
 This paper will now provide a comparative case of protracted displacement in 
Georgia, another nation in the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan’s neighbor to the northwest. 
Since the early 1990’s Georgia has been faced conflict in two secessionist provinces, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia175, which have produced thousands of IDPs. As of 2018, the 
IDMC estimated that there were 293,000 IDPs in Georgia, most originating from the 
secessionist provinces176. In 1996, Georgia passed its first law related to IDPs, by 2000 
the law had undergone several amendments to bring it in accordance with the Guiding 
Principles, as recommended by Francis Deng, the first UN Special Rapporteur for 
IDPs177.  Specifically, “the government adapted its national law on internal displacement 
[by] removing several legal provisions that hindered IDPs from fully accessing their 
 
175 See Appendix B 
176 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Georgia Figure Analysis – Displacement Related to Conflict 
and Violence, (IDMC, 2018) 1. 
177 Iulia Kharashvili et al., Experience of the Guiding Principles in Georgia, (Forced Migration Review, 
2008) 16. 
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rights as Georgian citizen”178. In 2003, a ruling from the Constitutional Court of Georgia 
established the rights of IDPs to purchase property without losing their IDP status and 
entitlement to return…”179. “In December 2005 Walter Kälin – Francis Deng’s 
successor – visited Georgia. Recommendations made in his mission report spurred 
the Georgian government to develop a holistic IDP State Strategy through the 
coordinated efforts of state agencies, international organizations and civil 
society”180. The State Strategy was “designed to provide a range of rights for IDPs 
including housing, employment, legal status, health, and education, and noted that 
integration was not a bar for future return to their original residence”181. The IDP 
State Strategy was significant because for the first time Georgian state authorities 
recognized the existence of solutions open to IDPs other than return182.  
 In August of 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, annexing Abkhazia and 
occupying South Ossetia. The August War, as it came to be known, fundamentally 
changed the policy landscape regarding Georgian IDPs. The “accompanying new 
wave of forced displacement [sic] provided the political momentum and attracted 
the necessary funding to advance IDPs’ local integration”183. In the wake of the 
August War, “the government and its main donors predominantly focused on 
providing IDPs with durable housing solutions”184. By 2014, the Georgian 
government had adopted a “livelihood strategy, which promotes specific measures 
 
178 Carolin Funke & Tamar Bolkvadze, Work in progress: The Guiding Principles in Georgia, (Forced 
Migration Review, 2018) 13. 
179 Iulia Kharashvili et al., Experience of the Guiding Principles in Georgia, 16. 
180 Carolin Funke & Tamar Bolkvadze, Work in progress: The Guiding Principles in Georgia, 13. 
181 Phil Orchard, Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality, 149. 
182 Carolin Funke & Tamar Bolkvadze, Work in progress: The Guiding Principles in Georgia, 13. 
183 Carolin Funke & Tamar Bolkvadze, Work in progress: The Guiding Principles in Georgia, 13. 
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to foster IDPs self-reliance”185. While Georgia has made significant strides on IDP 
policy, problems persist regarding “isolation and exclusion from larger social 
networks; lack of livelihood opportunities and access to land near their settlements; 
poor health; and lack of or inadequate information about their rights and support 
opportunities”186. However, despite these pitfalls, “the government of Georgia has 
made clear legal commitments to its IDP population, even if short of the standards 
of the Guiding Principles”187.        
 While Azerbaijan and Georgia face similar issues related to protracted 
internal displacement, and large IDP populations, the responses of the two 
governments could not be more different. While Azerbaijan has failed to implement 
the policy, recommendations provided by UN Special Rapporteurs Francis Deng, 
Walter Kälin, and Chaloka Beyani; Georgia has made significant changes to its IDP 
policy regime based on such recommendations. Lacking in strong domestic 
institutions other than the executive, Azerbaijan has been unable to codify aspects 
of the Guiding Principles, and IDP policy in a manner similar to Georgia. While 
Azerbaijan has made largely superficial commitments to supporting the trifecta of 
durable solutions, Georgia has developed a national strategy in partnership with 
major international organization in order to achieve such a goal. While Azerbaijan 
maintains that local integration will impede its territorial claims to sovereignty in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia has not precluded local integration from the prospect of 
return for IDPs from the occupied territories. The different approaches to IDP policy 
 
185 Ibid., 13. 
186 Ibid., 13. 
187 Phil Orchard, Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality, 151. 
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and durable solutions by the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments can be summed 
up in the following ways: while Georgia’s “efforts to provide IDPs with durable 
solutions remain frustrated by a lack of resources”, Azerbaijan’s efforts to provide 
IDPs with durable solutions remain frustrated by a lack of political will and 
desire188. 
Conclusion 
 As a case of internal displacement, and particularly that of protracted internal 
displacement, Azerbaijan is a well-known case. However, while well-known the 
Azerbaijan has been characterized variously as a state progressing in the implementation 
of durable solutions, and as a state in which implementation has stagnated189. This paper 
has argued that Azerbaijan is not only a state in which durable solutions have stagnated, 
but represents an emerging type of state, that in which durable solutions are deliberately 
impeded and undermined. In Azerbaijan, superficial change has been regarded as 
progress, and the even more concerning hinderances to durable solutions have gone 
relatively unnoticed.          
 This paper has sought to argue in definitive terms that Azerbaijan is undermining 
all durable solutions, except return for political purposes. This paper centered the issue of 
protracted internal displacement, and internal displacement more generally, as an 
individual responsibility of the states in which it occurs. Drawing on the Guiding 
Principles, this paper drew on Principle 28 which states  that “Competent authorities have 
 
188 Phil Orchard, Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality, 151. 
189 See Phil Orchard, Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality, 147. & Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Breaking the Impasse, (OCHA, 2017) 46.  
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the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, 
which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, 
to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of 
the country. Such authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or 
resettled internally displaced persons…”190. Establishing this state-centric understanding, 
the paper then applied Phil Orchard’s factors of success and failure to Azerbaijan. 
Arguing contrary to Orchard this paper found that Azerbaijan’s one factor of success, 
strong state capacity, actually represented the nation’s biggest impediment to 
implementing the Guiding Principles and durable solutions.    
 This paper then used the work of Walter Kälin to analyze a range of policies 
pertaining to the rights and protections of IDPs within Azerbaijan. This analysis yielded 
the finding that policies in Azerbaijan can generally be separated into two categories: 
policies which have the overall effect of undermining durable solutions, and policies 
which are specifically designed to impede durable solutions. This finding was 
emphasized and augmented through a comparative case study of protracted internal 
displacement in Georgia. The case study comparison of Georgia and Azerbaijan revealed 
the stark differences in the approaches of the two governments toward internal 
displacement. Georgia’s clear progression in implementing the Guiding Principles and 
durable solutions, further illustrated Azerbaijan’s stagnation and regression with regards 
to durable solutions.          
 This paper has presented Azerbaijan as a classic case of protracted internal 
displacement resulting from a lack of political will and desire to implement change. 
 
190 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 14.  
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However, this paper does have some limitations. There are relatively few sources used in 
this paper from within the Azerbaijani state or from individual IDPs living in Azerbaijan. 
This is mostly a result of the closed political climate within Azerbaijan, and the 
politicization of internal displacement which hinders accurate reporting and suppresses 
free speech on this issue. Additionally, the vast majority of sources used in this paper are 
from the mid-2010’s. This is due to the fact that major international organizations such as 
the United Nations and World Bank, the primary fact-finding bodies on internal 
displacement, only conduct occasional visits to Azerbaijan. The last time the UN Special 
Rapporteur for IDPs visited Azerbaijan was in 2014, and the last time a major livelihood 
assessment was conducted by the World Bank was also in 2014.   
 Re-examining the case of Azerbaijan through the Orchard- Kälin framework 
enables a greater understanding of cases in which the implementation of the Guiding 
Principles and durable solutions is being actively undermined. As more and more cases of 
internal displacement transition to a state of being protracted, scholars, practitioners, 
government officials, and international organization will have to grapple with finding 
new methods of advocacy and engagement with reluctant states. This paper can offer no 
solutions to these challenges but does seek to define and present a case of protracted 
internal displacement in Azerbaijan.        
 This paper will follow in the footsteps of the UN Special Rapporteurs, and other 
international organizations in making the following recommendations regarding IDP 
policy in Azerbaijan: IDPs should have the ability to purchase government-issued 
housing to foster financial independence and generational wealth; educational facilities 
should be fully integrated, and separate IDP schools should be phased out over a period 
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of years; IDPs should have the option to be registered either in their host community, or 
in their previous residence; and finally, Azerbaijani authorities should promote local 
integration, noting that integration does not impinge on an IDPs right to return. As noted 
by numerous other scholars, and international organizations, such changes would go a 
long way towards affecting positive change in the lives of Azerbaijani IDPs. However, 
until the authorities make a concerted effort to implement these changes, the lives of the 
IDPs impacted by such recalcitrance will likely remain unchanged. 
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